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Abstract 
Companies require data from multiple sources to develop new information systems, 
such as social networking, e-commerce, and location-based services. Systems rely 
on complex, multi-stakeholder data supply-chains to deliver value. These data 
supply-chains have complex privacy requirements: Privacy policies affecting multiple 
stakeholders (e.g., user, developer, company, government) regulate the collection, 
use, and sharing of data over multiple jurisdictions (e.g. California, United States, 
Europe). Increasingly, regulators expect companies to ensure consistency between 
company privacy policies and company data practices. To address this problem, we 
propose a methodology to map policy requirements in natural language to a formal 
representation in Description Logic. Using the formal representation, we reason 
about conflicting requirements within a single policy and among multiple policies in a 
data supply chain. Further, we enable tracing data flows within the supply-chain. We 
derive our methodology from an exploratory case study of the Facebook platform 
policy. We demonstrate the feasibility of our approach in an evaluation involving 
Facebook, Zynga and AOL-Advertising policies. Our results identify three conflicts 
that exist between Facebook and Zynga policies, and one conflict within the AOL 
Advertising policy.  
Keywords: Privacy, requirements, standardization, description logic, formal 
analysis.      
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Formal Analysis of Privacy Requirements 
Specifications for Multi-Tier Applications 
Introduction  
Increasingly, web and mobile information systems are leveraging user data 
collected from multiple sources without a clear understanding of data provenance or 
the privacy requirements that should follow this data. These emerging systems are 
based on multi-tier platforms in which the “tiers” may be owned and operated by 
different parties, such as cellular and wireless network providers, mobile and 
desktop operating system manufacturers, and mobile or web application developers. 
In addition, user services developed on these tiers are abstracted into platforms to 
be extensible by other developers, such as Google Maps, Facebook and LinkedIn. 
Application marketplaces, such as Amazon Appstore, Google Play and iTunes, have 
emerged to provide small developers increased access to customers, thus lowering 
the barrier to entry and increasing the risk of misusing personal information by 
inexperienced developers or small companies. Thus, platform and application 
developers bear increased, shared responsibility to protect user data as they 
integrate into these multi-tier ecosystems. 
In Canada, Europe, and the United States, privacy policies have served as 
contracts between users and their service providers and, in the U.S., these policies 
are often the sole means to enforce accountability [9]. In particular, Google has been 
found to re-purpose user data across their services in ways that violated earlier 
versions of their privacy policy [11], and Facebook’s third-party apps were found to 
transfer Facebook user data to advertisers in violation of Facebook’s Platform 
Policies [20]. The challenge for these companies is ensuring that software developer 
intentions at different tiers are consistent with privacy requirements across the entire 
ecosystem. To this end, we conducted a case study to formalize a subset of privacy-
relevant requirements from these policies. We believe such formalism could be used 
to verify that privacy requirements are consistent across this ecosystem: “App” 
developers could express their intentions formally and then check whether these 
intentions conflict with the requirements of third parties. Furthermore, platform 
developers could verify that their platform policy requirements are consistent with 
app developer requirements. 
Contributions: Our main contributions are as follows: (1) We systematically 
identify a subset of privacy-relevant requirements from privacy policies using a case 
study method; (2) we formalize data requirements subset in a privacy requirements 
specification language expressed using Description Logic (DL); the language 
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supports modeling actors, data and data use purpose hierarchies within data 
requirements; (3) we model requirements conflict checking using DL concept 
satisfiability, while ensuring decidability and computational bounds; and (4) we 
model tracing of data flows within a privacy policy.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the section titled 
Running Example, we introduce a running example based on our case study; in 
Approach, we introduce our formal language that we derived from our exploratory 
case study; in Exploratory Case Study, we report our method for deriving the 
language; in Extended Evaluation, we report our extended case study findings to 
evaluate the language across three privacy-related policies; in the section titled 
Threats to Validity, we consider threats to validity; in Related Work, we review 
related work; and in Discussion and Conclusion, we conclude with discussion and 
summary. 
Running Example 
We illustrate the problem and motivate our approach using a running 
example: In Figure 1, we present privacy policy excerpts from the Facebook 
Platform Policy that governs Zynga, the company that produces the depicted 
Farmville game. The solid colored arrows trace from the visual elements that the 
user sees in their web browser on the right-hand side to governing policy excerpts 
on the left-hand side. The dotted black lines along the left-hand side show how data 
flows across these application layers. Zynga has a third-party relationship with 
Advertising.com, a subsidiary of AOL Advertising that serves the online ad “Buying 
Razors Sucks” in this game. Zynga also produces a version of this game for the 
Android and iPhone mobile devices, which are available through the Google Play 
and iTunes marketplaces and which have their own platform developer policies that 
are not depicted here.  
As the platform provider, Facebook manages basic user account information, 
including user IDs, friend lists, and other data that may be made available to Zynga 
under Facebook’s platform policy. The Facebook policy excerpt in Figure 1 prohibits 
the developer (Zynga) from transferring any data to advertisers, regardless of 
whether users consent to the transfer. Zynga’s privacy policy also prohibits such 
transfers, unless the user consents (an apparent conflict). Furthermore, AOL 
Advertising (the advertiser) retains the right to use collected information to better 
target advertising to users across multiple platforms, for which Farmville is just one 
example. Because this ad is placed by Zynga, AOL Advertising is a third-party 
advertiser and Facebook expects Zynga to ensure that AOL adheres to the rules 
governing access to Facebook’s user data. At the time of this writing, Farmville was 
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the top Facebook App with over 41.8 million active users per month,1 and Facebook 
reports that over 9 million apps2 exist for their platform, in general. Thus, this simple 
scenario has many potential variations.  
 
Figure 1. Privacy Policy Excerpts and Data Flows Mapped to Web Content 
That the Users See in Their Browsers 
In Figure 2, we illustrate a data supply chain between a user, Facebook, 
Zynga, and AOL. The arrows denote data flows among the four actors, and the 
policies regulate these flows. Under the Facebook privacy policy, Facebook is 
permitted to collect and use the user’s age and gender. Facebook may transfer that 
information to its developers’ apps, such as Farmville developed by Zynga. 
However, the Facebook platform policy prohibits Zynga from transferring any 
Facebook user information, including aggregate data, to an advertiser, such as AOL. 
For a user, it is clear that she has privacy policy agreements with Facebook and 
Zynga, because these are first-party services. However, it is unlikely the user is 
aware of AOL’s privacy agreement or that data flows to AOL. To identify the 
advertiser supplying the ad in Figure 1, Buying Razors Sucks, we had to collect 
TCP/IP network traffic using a traffic analyzer (Wireshark). The network traffic 
revealed the domain r1.ace.advertising.com as the server serving the ad into 
Farmville. Upon visiting the r1.ace.advertising.com website, the link to their privacy 
policy at http://www.advertising.com/privacy_policy.php contains an error message. 
Scrolling to the bottom of the webpage, the user can then click a “privacy” hyperlink 
to visit AOL’s privacy policy that describes Advertising.com’s privacy practices at 
http://advertising.aol.com/privacy. 
                                            
1 See http://www.appdata.com on January 12, 2013. 
2 Facebook SEC Amendment No. 4 to Form S-1, April 23, 2012. 
AOL Advertising uses the 
information collected on Network 
Participating Sites to better target 
advertisements to people across 
different websites 
Zynga: We do not actively share 
personal information with third 
party advertisers for their direct 
marketing purposes unless you 
give us your consent 
Facebook: You will not directly 
or indirectly transfer any data 
you receive from us to any ad 
network, even if a user consents 
to such transfer 
Key: Data flow Content owner 
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This example illustrates how different parties reuse content from other parties 
to build more complex systems and how developers need tools to ensure 
consistency between privacy requirements across different parties. However, at 
present, policies expressed in natural language remain disconnected, and hence 
software can freely deviate from the coordination required and expected across 
these different parties. To address this problem we propose to develop a formal 
language as an interlingua to describe requirements that map natural language 
policy to formal statements that can eventually be traced to software.  
 
 
Figure 2. Example Data Supply Chain Through Facebook, Zynga,  
and AOL Advertising 
Approach 
We aim to improve privacy by introducing a privacy requirements specification 
that serves to align multi-party expectations across multi-tier applications. This 
specification would express a critical subset of policy statements in a formalism that 
we can check for requirements conflicts. This includes conflicts within a party’s 
specification and conflicts between two or more specifications of different parties. 
We base our approach on semantic parameterization, wherein natural language 
requirements phrases are mapped to actions and roles in Description Logic (DL) [8]. 
This format was validated using 100 privacy policy goals [6] and over 300 data 
requirements governing health information [7]. We now introduce DL, followed by 
our precise definition of the privacy requirements specification. 
Introduction to Description Logic 
Description Logic (DL) is a subset of first-order logic for expressing 
knowledge. A DL knowledge base KB is comprised of intensional knowledge, which 














Facebook AOL Zynga 
permit collection/use of 
age, gender;  
permit transfer of age, 
gender to Zynga  
permit use of age, gender;  
prohibit transfer of Facebook  
user info (including aggregate)  
to AOL 
permit collection/use of 
age, gender from Facebook; 
permit transfer of 
aggregate data to AOL 
permit collection/
use of age, gender 







hidden data flow 
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knowledge, which consists of properties, objects and individuals (assertions) in the 
ABox [4]. In this paper, we use the DL family ALC, which includes logical 
constructors for union, intersection, negation, and full existential qualifiers over roles. 
The reasoning tasks of concept satisfiability, concept subsumption and ABox 
consistency in ALC are PSPACE-complete [4]. 
Reasoning in DL begins with an interpretation  that consists of a nonempty 
set ∆ , called the domain of interpretation, and the interpretation function .  that 
maps concepts and roles to subsets as follows: Every atomic concept C is assigned 
a subset ⊆ ∆  and every role  is assigned the subset ⊆ ∆ ∆ . For each 
a, b ∈ R , b is called the filler. Description Logic defines two special concepts:  
(top) with the interpretation 	∆ and  (bottom) with interpretation ⊘. In 
addition to constructors for union, intersection and negation, DL provides a 
constructor to constrain role values, written R.C, which means the filler for the role R 
belongs to the concept C. The interpretation function is extended to concept 
definitions in the DL family ALC as follows, where C and D are concepts, R is a role 
in the TBox and a and b are individuals in the ABox: 
	
C 	 ∆ ∖	C 	
C	⊓	D	 	 C ∩ D 		
C	⊔	D	 	 C ∪ D 		
∀R. C 	 ∈ ∆ 	 ∀b. a, b ∈ R → ∈ C 	
∃R. C 	 ∈ ∆ 	 ∃b. a, b ∈ R ∧ ∈ C  
Description Logic includes axioms for subsumption, disjointness and 
equivalence with respect to a TBox. Subsumption is used to describe individuals 
using generalities, and we say a concept C subsumes a concept D, written ⊨ ⊑
, if D ⊆ C 	for all interpretations  that satisfy the TBox T. The concept C is 
disjointed from a concept D, written ⊨ ⊓ → , if D ∩ C ⊘	for all 
interpretations  that satisfy the TBox T. The concept C is equivalent to a concept D, 
written ⊨ C ≡ D, if C D 	for all interpretations  that satisfy the TBox T. 
Privacy Requirements Specifications 
We define a privacy requirements specification to be a DL knowledgebase 
KB. The universe of discourse consists of concepts in the TBox T, including the set 
Req of data requirements, the set Actor of actors with whom data is shared, the set 
Action of actions that are performed on the data, the set Datum of data elements on 
which actions are performed, and the set Purpose of purposes for which data may 
be acted upon. The following definitions precisely define the specification. The 
concepts for actor, datum and purpose can be organized into a hierarchy using DL 
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subsumption. Figure 3 illustrates three hierarchies from our case study for datum, 
purposes and actors: Inner bullets indicate when a concept is subsumed by the 
outer bullet concept (e.g., information subsumes public-information under Datum). 
 
Figure 3. Example Datum, Purpose and Actor Hierarchy From Zynga 
Privacy Policy Expressable in Description Logic 
Note. Inner-bullet concepts are subsumed by (contained within) outer-bullet concepts; italicized red 
text denotes branches that were inferred to structure orphaned concepts. 
Definition 1. Each action concept ∈  has assigned roles that relate the 
action to actors, data elements and purposes. We begin with three default actions: 
COLLECT, which describes any act by a first party to access, collect, obtain, receive 
or acquire data from another party; TRANSFER, which describes any act by a first 
party to transfer, move, send or relocate data to another party; and USE, which 
describes any act by a first party to use data in any way for their own purpose. In the 
future, we may extend these actions (e.g., with aggregation, analysis, storage and 
so on), as needed. Actions are further described by DL roles in the set of Roles as 
follows: 
 hasObject.Datum denotes a binary relationship between an action and 
the data element on which the action is performed; 
 hasSource.Actor denotes a binary relationship between an action and 
the source actor from whom the data was collected; 
 hasPurpose.Purpose denotes a binary relationship between an action 
and the purpose for which the action is performed; and 
 hasTarget.Actor denotes a binary relationship between a TRANSFER 
and the target actor to whom data was transferred 
Each action has role hasObject, hasSource and hasPurpose, but only the 
TRANSFER action has the role hasTarget. The hasObject and hasSource roles are 
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to trace data elements from any action back to the original source from which that 
data was collected, as we discuss in Tracing Data Flows Within a Single 
Specification. 
Definition 2. A requirement is a DL equivalence axiom ∈  that is comprised of 
the DL intersection of an action concept ∈  and a role expression that 
consists of the DL intersection of roles ∃ ⊓ …∃ ∈ . Consider requirement 
 for _ ∈ , and _ ∈  in the TBox T, such that it 
is true that 
 
⊨ ≡ ⊓ ∃ . ⊓   
														∃ . ⊓ (1) 
														∃ . _    
Figure 4 illustrates two requirements wherein concepts in the Actor, Datum and 
Purpose hierarchies (circles) are linked to each requirement via roles (colored 
arrows): p5 describes the act of collecting IP addresses from anyone for a range of 
advertising-related purposes, and r7 describes the collection of IP addresses from 
advertisers for any purpose. 
In addition, each requirement is contained within exactly one modality, which 
is a concept in the TBox T as follows: Permission contains all actions that an actor is 
permitted to perform; Obligation contains all actions that an actor is required to 
perform; and Prohibition contains all actions that an actor is prohibited from 
performing. We adapted the axioms of Deontic Logic, wherein a required action is 
necessarily permitted [13]; hence it is true that ⊨ ⊑ , 
wherein each required action is necessarily permitted. Thus, if our collection 
requirement  is required such that ⊨ ⊑ , then it is also true that 
⊨ ⊑ . Using this formulation, we can compare the interpretations of 
two requirements based on the role fillers to precisely infer any conflicts, a topic 
considered next in Requirements Conflicts. 
Requirements Conflicts  
Our formalism enables conflict detection between what is permitted and what 
is prohibited. A conflict in predicate logic is expressed as ∧
↔ , in which x is a DL individual in the ABox A. To 
implement these techniques, we compute an extension of the TBox that itemizes 
individual interpretations of the actors, data and purposes. 
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Figure 4. Diagram to Illustrate Itemized Interpretations Wherein Permission 
p5 and Prohibition r7 are Conflicting but Do Not Subsume One 
Another 
The itemized interpretations allow us to identify conflicts within the 
intersection of complex descriptions that cannot be identified using DL intersection 
alone. In Figure 4, the requirement p5 is a permission, whereas the requirement r7 is 
a prohibition. We cannot infer a direct subsumption relationship between these two 
requirements, because each requirement contains an interpretation that exists 
outside the other (e.g., Zynga is a permitted source for collecting IP addresses, and 
payment processing is a prohibited purpose). However, there is a conflict between 
these two requirements: It is both permitted and prohibited for a third-party to collect 
IP addresses for advertising-related purposes. To detect these conflicts, we define 
an extended specification ∪  that consists of an extended TBox  = 
∪  containing the original terminology T and axioms ∈  that itemize 
interpretations for requirements ∈ , such that ⊨ ⊑ . The ABox  contains 
individuals assigned to these interpretations.  
Definition 3. The extension is a set of axioms E that itemize the interpretations for 
each requirement. An itemized interpretation of an arbitrary description X is written 
	 \	 	for a concept C that subsumes a concept D. By itemizing 
interpretations in a requirement’s role fillers, we can precisely realize a specific 
conflicting interpretation across a permission and a prohibition. 
For each requirement written in the form ≡ ⊓ ∃ . ⊓ ∃ . ⊓ …	⊓
∃ .  in the TBox T, such that ∈ , ,  and … ∈
, we derive an itemized interpretation  in the TBox that is written in the form 
≡ ⊓ ∃ . ⊓ ∃ . ⊓ …	⊓ ∃ . 	by replacing each role filler  with a new 
role filler , which is computed to exclude all sub-concepts ⊏  in the TBox T as 











Permitted Collection = p5 r7 = Prohibited Collection 
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TBox . To realize the itemized interpretation and later report the conflict to an 
analyst, we assign a unique individual  to the assertion ∈ . 
Definition 4. A conflict is an interpretation that is both permitted and required and 
that satisfies the TBox , such that it is true that ⊨ ≡ ⊓
. For an individual  in the extended ABox , each conflict is realized 
with respect to two or more conflicting requirements , ∈ , such that it is true 
that ⊨ ∧ ∧  for  and an interpretation  that satisfies the 
ABox . If there exists no individual ∈ such that ⊨ , then a 
privacy specification KB is conflict-free. 
Tracing Data Flows Within a Single Specification  
Conflict-free privacy requirements specifications describe permitted 
collections, transfers and uses of personal information. Using these specifications, 
we can trace any data element from collection requirements to requirements that 
permit the use or transfer of that data. This is important because organizations often 
need to ensure that policies covering collected data are implemented across their 
organization. Moreover, the actions to use and transfer data may be performed by 
separate information systems from those where the data is collected, and thus we 
can use these specifications to discover which systems data is required or permitted 
to flow to. To trace data across a specification, we introduce the following definitions. 
Definition 5. A trace is a subset of requirements pairs , ∈ 	 	  that map 
from a permitted source action  to a permitted target action  for an interpretation 
 that satisfies the TBox . For example, we can trace permitted data collections 
(source action) to permitted data uses and data transfers (target actions) when the 
role values for the source actor, datum and purpose entail a shared interpretation. 
For each requirement written in the form ≡ ⊓ ∃ , . , ⊓ ∃ , . , ⊓ …	⊓
∃ , . ,  in the TBox , such that ∈ , ,  and , … , ∈
, we compare role fillers , … ,  between the source and target permissions 
to yield one of four exclusive Modes as follows: 
 U: Underflow, occurs when the data target subsumes the source, if and 
only if ⊨ , ⊑ ,  
 O: Overflow, occurs when the data source subsumes the target, if and 
only if ⊨ , ⊑ ,  
 E: Exact flow, occurs when the data source and target are equivalent, 
if and only if ⊨ , ≡ ,  
 N: No flow, otherwise 
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Figure 5 presents an example data flow trace from our case study. The 
collection requirements AOL-16 and AOL-14 trace to the transfer requirement AOL-
48. The transfer requirement does not specify a purpose, which we interpret to mean 
“any purpose.” Thus, the collection purposes “business purposes” and “contacting 
you to discuss our products and services” are more specific than the transfer 
purpose “any purpose,” which the red links illustrate as underflows. The data 
elements in AOL-16 are similarly more specific than the transfer data elements.  
 
 
Figure 5. Example Data Flow Trace 
Note. Thick red lines represent underflows, and thinner black lines represent exact flows. 
Below, the collection requirement p1 in formula 3 encodes part of AOL-16 in 
Figure 5, and p2 in formula 4 encodes the corresponding transfer requirement for 
AOL-48. In formula 2, contact information is subsumed by personally identifiable 
information (PII); thus, it is true that: 
 
 ⊨ _ ⊑      (2) 
    ⊨ ≡ ⊓ ∃ . _   (3)	
⊓ ∃ . _ 	 ⊓ ∃ . _    
⊨ ≡ ⊓ ∃ . ⊓ ∃ . 	 ⊓	
∃ . _ 	 ⊓ ∃ .    (4) 
Based on the subsumption axiom entailed in formula 2, we can map the trace 
, ⟶ , ,  onto the three Modes for the roles hasObject, hasSource and 
hasPurpose, respectively. In general, tracing data flows allows an analyst to 
visualize dependencies between collection, use and transfer requirements. In this 
paper, we only formalize traces within a single policy. In future work, we will present 
tracing data flows across multiple policies in a data supply chain. This cross-policy 
tracing extends our notion of a trace but requires a shared lexicon or dictionary to 
AOL-14: Collect personally identifiable  
information for contacting you to  
discuss our products and services 
AOL-16: Collect name, contact 
information, payment method from 
site visitor for business purposes 
AOL-48: Transfer personally identifiable 
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unify terminology across two or more policies. In our evaluation, we present select 
findings from cross-policy tracing. 
Exploratory Case Study 
We conducted an exploratory case study on the Facebook Platform Policy by 
systematically coding policy statements for formalization in the privacy requirements 
specification language. We mapped statements into one of the two categories: policy 
statements describe an action outside the scope of the application such as “You 
must not violate any law or the rights of any individual or entity.” They also include 
non-data requirements that describe the app but are not concerned with handling 
data, for example, “You will include your privacy policy URL in the App Dashboard.” 
Separately, data requirements describe actions performed on data, such as “You 
must not include functionality that proxies, requests or collects Facebook usernames 
or passwords.” We developed our formal language to express privacy requirements 
from the formative study results and further validated this language in a summative 
study on two additional policies from Zynga and AOL using this same process. We 
were particularly interested in boundary cases that describe the limitations of our 
proposed language. 
Figure 6 presents an example data requirement from the Zynga privacy 
policy. The identifier Z-92 indicates this is the 92nd statement in Zynga policy. In step 
1, we identify the action using phrase heuristics (e.g., “provide” indicates a 
TRANSFER action): The modality permission is identified by the modal keyword 
“will,” the datum by “information,” the target to whom the data is transferred by “third 
party companies,” and the purpose by the phrase “to perform services on our behalf 
…” Purposes and other values may appear in comma-separate lists, which we 
interpret as disjunctions. In Figure 6, this purpose includes examples, which we 
separately translate into a purpose hierarchy similar to that shown in Figure 3. While 
this policy statement refers to “your information,” it is unclear where this information 
was collected. User data can be collected from the user, data brokers or advertisers. 
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Figure 6. Steps to Map Data Requirement From Natural Language to DL 
Note. Step 1 shows data the requirement in the Zynga privacy policy; step 2 shows the requirement 
expressed in language syntax; and step 3 shows the statement expressed in DL semantics. 
After we identify the values to assign to the roles, in step 2 we write these values 
into a privacy requirements specification language that uses an SQL-like syntax and 
our DL semantics described in our Approach section. The letter “P” indicates that 
this is a permission, followed by the action verb, the object and keywords to indicate 
the source (“FROM”), target (“TO”) and the purpose (“FOR”). Once translated into 
the language, we use a tool to parse the language and generate OWL DL that we 
reason over by using open source DL theorem provers (e.g., HermiT and Fact++). 
During the case study, we traced all the keywords to indicate when an action 
was a collection, use or transfer; these appear in Table 1. Among the keywords, 
many overlap across actions (e.g., access, use, share) while others are more 
exclusive (e.g., collect, disclose, transfer). The reason for this ambiguity is due to 
policies that include multiple viewpoints: A policy may describe access to a user’s 
data by the app, which is a collection, or it may describe a third-party’s access, 
which assumes a transfer. In these cases, the analyst should identify the viewpoint 
to correctly formalize the policy statement and consider reviewing their formalization 
for keywords that are known to be ambiguous. 
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Table 1. Phrase Heuristics Used to Indicate When a Statement Was a 
Collection, Use, or Transfer Requirement 
DL Action Action Keywords
COLLECT Access, assign, collect, collected, collection, collects, 
give you, import, keep, observes, provide, receive, 
record, request, share, use 
USE Access, accessed, communicate, delivering, include, 
matches, send, use, used, uses, using, utilized 
TRANSFER Access, disclose, disclosed, disclosure, give, in 
partnership with, include, make public, on behalf of, 
provide, see, share, shared, transfer, use, used with, 
utilized by 
Extended Evaluation 
We evaluated our approach by extending our exploratory case study and 
implementing a tool-based performance simulation. As a problem domain, we chose 
the Facebook Platform as our starting point, because Facebook has received 
significant attention from privacy advocates and Facebook apps are frequently 
available on mobile device platforms, which provides a second context to study this 
problem in future work. From here, we chose the Farmville application, which at the 
time of our study, was the most used Facebook app with over 40.8 million active 
users per month. We analyzed the following three policies: 
 Facebook Platform Policy, last revised 12 Dec 2012, which governs 
app developer practices in Facebook 
 Zynga Privacy Policy, last updated 30 Sep 2011, which governs the 
user’s privacy while they play Farmville and use other Zynga 
applications 
 AOL Advertising, last updated 4 May 2011, which governs advertising 
distributed through Farmville and other websites and applications  
In Table 2, we illustrate the scope of this evaluation, including the total 
number of statements in the policies (S), the number of data requirements (D), which 
we break-down into the number of permissions (P), obligations (O), and prohibitions 
(R), including which among these requirements concerns collection (C), use (U) or 
transfer (T) of data. Between 32–55% of these policies described data requirements 
with generally few obligations. The Zynga and AOL policies describe their own 
practices and focus more on permissible data practices, whereas the Facebook 
policy describes developer practices and focuses more on prohibitions. We now 
discuss findings from our formal analysis that includes conflicts and opportunities to 
extend our approach or limitations of the current work. 
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P O R C U T 
Facebook 105 39 1 4 2 6 1 14
Zynga 195 64 5 1 8 2 8 15
AOL 74 41 4 0 4 1 1 10
Example Conflicts Identified Using the Language 
We found conflicts between Facebook and Zynga, and one conflict within the 
AOL policy, which we now discuss. 
Conflicts Between Facebook and Zynga 
The Facebook Platform policy governs the data practices of Farmville, which 
is also governed by the developer Zynga’s privacy policy. To conduct this conflict 
analysis, we performed an ontological alignment between terms in both policies that 
we formalized in DL using equivalence and subsumption. Using our formalization, 
we detected a conflict between these policies regarding the sharing of aggregate or 
anonymous data. Facebook requirement FB-43 prohibits a developer from 
transferring any user data obtained from Facebook to an ad network, whereas 
Zynga requirement Z-107 permits sharing aggregate data received from any source 
with anyone: 
FB-43: R TRANSFER user-data FROM facebook TO ad-network FOR anything  
Z-107: P TRANSFER aggregate-information,anonymous-information FROM anyone 
TO anyone 
The Zynga permission is inferred from an exclusion, which states “Our collection, 
use, and disclosure of anonymous or aggregated information are not subject to any 
of the restrictions in this Privacy Policy.” The Zynga definition of aggregate-
information means non-personally identifiable information, which may include 
Facebook user data, such as gender, zip code and birthdate, which are often viewed 
as not individually identifiable despite evidence to the contrary [21]. Under 
Facebook, the concept user–data is defined to include aggregate and anonymous 
data as follows: “By any data we mean all data obtained through the use of the 
Facebook Platform (API, Social Plugins, etc.), including aggregate, anonymous or 
derivative data,” which we encoded in the datum concept hierarchy. 
The second conflict appears where Zynga permits the transfer of unique user 
IDs to third party advertisers that advertise on Zynga’s Offer Wall. The purposes for 
sharing user IDs are crediting user accounts and preventing fraud. However, this 
sharing violates Facebook requirement FB-43 above. The Zynga requirement Z-113 
describes the permission involved in this conflict: The Zynga user-id, which Zynga 
defines as either a unique Zynga user ID or the social networking service user ID, 
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
dê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=çÑ=_ìëáåÉëë=C=mìÄäáÅ=mçäáÅó - 15 - 
k~î~ä=mçëíÖê~Çì~íÉ=pÅÜççä=
can thus be a data element within the Facebook user-data, which includes the 
Facebook user ID.  
Z-113: P TRANSFER unique-id,user-id TO offer-wall-provider FOR crediting-
user-account,preventing-fraud 
Finally, the Facebook and Zynga policies conflict on sharing data for the 
purposes of merger and acquisition by a third-party. In case of merger or acquisition, 
Facebook allows a developer to continue using the data within the app but prohibits 
the transfer of data outside the app. Zynga does not put restrictions on data transfer, 
including personal data, for the purpose of merger of acquisition. The Facebook 
statement “If you are acquired by or merge with a third party, you can continue to 
use user data within your application, but you cannot transfer data outside your 
application” (FB-50) and the Zynga statement “In the event that Zynga undergoes a 
business transition, such as a merger, acquisition, … we may transfer all of your 
information, including personal information, to the successor organization in such 
transition” (Z-115) map to these two requirements (information includes user data): 
FB-50: R TRANSFER user-data FROM facebook TO third-party FOR 
merger,acquisition 
Z-115: P TRANSFER information FOR merger,acquisition 
Conflict Within AOL Advertising  
The AOL privacy policy contains an apparent conflict regarding collection and 
use of personally identifiable information. Unlike the Facebook and Zynga policies, 
the AOL policy describes data practices from multiple stakeholder viewpoints, 
simultaneously, including that of their affiliate Advertising.com. The conflict appears 
from the AOL Advertising viewpoint in a statement, “Personal information such as 
name, address and phone number is never accessed for [targeted advertising]” 
(AOL-27). The policy also states, “Advertisers utilizing Advertising.com Sponsored 
Listings technology may provide personally-identifiable information to 
Advertising.com Sponsored Listings, which may then be combined with information 
about purchasing patterns of Advertising.com Sponsored Listings’ products and 
services, ... and all other information provided by the advertiser” (AOL-46). In 
addition, the following statement declares that this information may be used for 
targeted advertising: “this information is used to improve the applications provided to 
advertisers, improve the relevancy of ad serving and any other use deemed helpful 
to Advertising.com Sponsored Listings” (AOL-47). Note that the advertiser may be 
collecting the personally identifiable information from the user. The conflicting 
statements are:  
AOL-27: R USE personally-identifiable-information FROM registration-
environment FOR target-ads-that-are most-appropriate-for-site-
visitor 
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AOL-46: P COLLECT personally-identifiable-information FROM anyone FOR 
improving-the-applications-provided-to-advertisers, improving-the-
relevancy-of-ad-serving, anything  
Opportunities for Extending the Language 
Among the data requirements that we identified, we were unable to formalize 
requirements that describe actions outside the scope of collection, use and transfer 
as defined in Definition 1. The un-encoded requirements include how data is merged 
and stored and the policy implications of consent. We now discuss these three 
categories of requirement. 
Merging Data From Different Sources 
The three policies in our study contain 12 requirements that describe how 
data is linked, combined or aggregated from multiple sources. For example, the 
Zynga privacy policy states “some of the cookies [that] the service places on your 
computer are linked to your user ID number(s)” (Z-57) and “[information from other 
sources] will be combined with other information we collect” (Z-83), and “additionally, 
we may keep statistics regarding toolbar use on an aggregated basis” (Z-62). In 
each of these three examples, data is linked, combined or aggregated with different 
implications. Linking data enables companies to derive inferences from correlations 
(i.e., statistical analyses) and to re-identify otherwise anonymized data. Combining 
data with other data raises this question: What purpose governs the combined data, 
and how long should the combined data be retained (the minimum or maximum 
period of the previously separate data sets?) Finally, aggregate data decreases the 
level of detail that an organization has on users. For example, knowing how many 
users are aged between 21 and 25 years old is different than knowing the specific 
birth dates of each user. Thus, aggregation requirements may indicate improved 
user privacy, but they also limit the types of linking and combining that can occur 
later, if needed. 
Storing and Deleting Information 
We observed 15 data storage requirements and eight data deletion 
requirements in our study. The act of storing, retaining and deleting data has 
temporal implications: Once data is stored, it exists to be acted upon for the duration 
of storage; when data is deleted, it is no longer available for use, transfer, and so 
forth. For example, the AOL Advertising privacy policy states that, “log files, 
including detailed clickstream data used to create behavioral segments, are retained 
… for no longer than 2 years” (AOL-31). While DL is suited for reasoning about 
subsumption, different temporal logics exist for reasoning about time. We are looking 
into extensions to DL for temporal reasoning [17] that can be used to express these 
remaining privacy requirements. 
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Managing the Implications of Consent  
In our analysis, 14 consent requirements were observed that require an 
organization to permit or prohibit a data action unless a user provides consent to 
perform that action. We observed two different approaches. Opt-in requirements 
default to data user prohibitions in our language but can be flipped to permissions 
when a user provides their consent; opt-out requirements default to data user 
permissions but can be flipped to prohibitions when a user chooses to revoke 
consent. For example, the Facebook Platform Policy contains the opt-in statement, 
“For all other data obtained through the use of the Facebook API, you must obtain 
explicit consent from the user who provided the data to us before using it for any 
purpose other than displaying it back to the user on your application” (FB-42). In 
contrast, the Zynga Privacy Policy contains the opt-out statement, “When we offer 
[user] profiles, we will also offer functionality that allows you to opt-out of public 
indexing of your public profile information” (Z-30). Because opt-in and opt-out 
statements can change the interpretation of how data may be used and transferred 
based on the choices of the user, these statements can introduce conflicts into a 
previously conflict-free policy after the user has made their choice. We plan to 
further explore how to reason about consent in future work.   
Challenges Due to Formats and Writing Styles 
We observe different formats and phrasing that affect our approach, which we 
now discuss.  
Embedded policies: A policy may contain hyperlinks to other policies. For 
completeness, it is important to analyze these links to assess whether the linked 
content contains relevant data requirements. The additional data requirements may 
reveal further inconsistent statements within a policy or across multiple policies. In 
our case study, the Facebook, Zynga and AOL Advertising policies each had 19, 16 
and five links, respectively. The links serve different purposes, including linking to 
policies on special topics such as advertising policies (Facebook) or user rights and 
responsibilities (Zynga). These special topic policies were hosted by the same 
company and include additional data requirements, sometimes from a different 
stakeholder viewpoint. In addition, policies may link to third-party policies, such as 
conduit.com (Zynga) or to additional data definitions or specific examples of data 
requirements (Facebook). Other links, such as “contact us” (AOL) and “change email 
preferences” (Zynga), do not lead to additional data requirements. Due to the large 
number of links that may arise across multiple websites, this problem suggests a 
need for additional automation using natural language processing techniques to 
identify relevant policies.   
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Separate collection, use, and sharing sections: A policy may describe data 
collection, purpose for collection, and data sharing requirements in different 
sections. At the surface, this format makes extracting formal specifications easier, 
because each statement is relatively independent. However, the format can de-
couple the collection requirements from use and transfer requirements through the 
use of ambiguity (e.g., using different terms or omitting sources, targets and 
purposes). The Zynga Privacy Policy separately describes the information types 
collected (see “Information We Collect”) from the purposes for use (see “How We 
Use the Information We Collect”). This separation yields a many-to-many mapping 
between information types and purposes, because the analyst must reasonably 
assume that any data type maps to any purpose. In Figure 7, we present the data 
flow tracing for the hasObject role: The Zynga policy shows numerous requirements 
(nodes) with multiple cross-traces among collections to transfers due to the many-to-
many mapping. Contrast the Zynga policy with the AOL Advertising policy, in which 
requirements have an observably smaller valiancy or edge count. Many-to-many 
tracing is likely an indicator of a less privacy protective policy, because it affords 
companies more opportunities to use data in difficult to comprehend or 
unforeseeable ways. 
 
Figure 7. Data Flow Traces Inferred From the Zynga Policy (left) and AOL 
Policy (right) 
Note. Arrows point from collections to transfers, red lines show underflows, blue lines show overflows, 
and black lines show exact flows (see Definition 5). The Zynga policy defines broad transfer rights as 
seen by the three nodes with multiple incoming arrows. 
Zynga AOL 
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Ambiguous and vague terms: Policies may contain vague or ambiguously 
worded purposes. For example, the Zynga privacy policy contains a statement, “in 
some cases, we will associate this information with your user ID number for our 
internal use” (Z-74). The purpose “internal use” is vague, and an analyst can 
interpret this to mean any action performed by the actor, excluding perhaps 
transfers. Other examples include “operate our business” (AOL-51) and “data 
analysis” (Z-92). Further, policies may not define data items precisely. For example, 
the Zynga Privacy Policy describes “personal information” but does not define what 
this category includes, whereas other policies will refine this term into sub-
categories. In such cases, the analyst may need to infer their own subsumption 
relationships that do not map to specific phrases or statements within the original 
policy to test for potential conflicts. 
Multi-stakeholder viewpoints: A single policy can assign data requirements to 
multiple stakeholder viewpoints. For example, AOL Advertising describes data 
practices for sites operated by AOL Advertising, affiliates and subsidiaries as “AOL 
Advertising Sites” and on sites operated by publishers that participate in the AOL 
advertising network as “Network Participant Sites.” Our approach encodes policies in 
the first-person viewpoint of a single stakeholder; thus policies such as AOL 
Advertising’s policy can be decomposed into separate policies. In future work, we 
plan to study ways to analyze data requirements across multiple policies. 
Simulation Results 
We conducted a performance simulation to evaluate the computational 
practicality of using our language to reason about data requirements. While we 
reduce conflict detection to DL satisfiability, which is PSPACE-complete for a-cyclic 
TBoxes and the DL family ALC in which we express our language, we recognize that 
this bound does not ensure that our language is practical for reasonable size 
specifications. Therefore, we implemented a prototype parser and compiler for our 
language using three popular theorem provers: The Pellet OWL2 Reasoner v2.3.0 
from Clark and Parsia, the Fact++ Reasoner v1.5.2 from Tsarkov and Horrocks, and 
the HermiT Reasoner v1.3.4 by the Knowledge Representation and Reasoning 
Group at the University of Oxford. 
We generated 32 privacy requirements specifications with actor, datum and 
purpose hierarchies comprised of binary trees with 23 concepts; this yields 
specifications with up to 1,280 itemized interpretations. We conducted several 
preliminary runs and determined that concept tree height had no effect on 
performance. Of the three reasoners, only the Pellet Reasoner did not respond 
within 30 minutes when realizing a policy of only four requirements. Thus, we 
discuss results only from the Fact++ and HermiT reasoners.  
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Figure 8 presents the performance time of the Fact++ and HermiT reasoners 
with respect to the specification size: The 32 runs are sorted along the x-axis from 
the fewest to the most requirements (from 3 to 72); the y-axis describes the 
response time in tenths of a second (solid red) and number of requirements (dotted 
blue). As the requirements increase to 73, we see that Fact++ response time 
remains constant, whereas the HermiT response times appear to increase slightly 
(Pearson’s R = 0.533). To understand this increase, we present Figure 9 that 
compares the Fact++ and HermiT reasoners by number of conflicts: The 32 runs are 
sorted along the x-axis from fewest to the most requirements (from 3 to 73); the y-
axis describes the response time in tenths of a second (solid red) and the number of 
conflicts (dotted blue).  
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Figure 8. Performance Time of Fact++ and HermiT reasoners on Privacy 
Requirements Specifications With Respect to Number of 
Requirements 
Figure 9 shows, and we confirmed, that the response time of the HermiT 
reasoner is linear in the number of conflicts (Pearson’s R = 0.966). The performance 
of a theorem prover depends on what type of inferences that prover is optimized to 
perform: Pellet produces a non-deterministic choice when handling general concept 
inclusion (GCI) axioms [16], which we rely on in our formalism; however, Fact++ and 
HermiT are not limited in this way. From this simulation, we believe the language is 
computationally practical for policies within the order of 100 requirements; however, 
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Figure 9. Performance Time of Fact++ and HermiT Reasoners on Privacy 
Requirements Specifications With Respect to Number of Conflicts 
Threats to Validity 
Here we discuss the generalizability of our mapping methodology. To address 
construct validity, we maintained a project workbook that contains mappings of 
natural language statements to our language syntax and notes about shortfalls and 
boundary cases in our interpretation. We report on several of these shortfalls in 
Opportunities for Extending the Language as limitations of our approach.  
Construct validity reflects whether the construct we propose to measure is 
indeed what we measured [24]. While mapping statements to our formalism, we use 
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formalism. These heuristics may require additional context outside a given statement 
to identify the action, source, target and purposes. As discussed in Exploratory Case 
Study, we need to resolve ambiguity in the phrase-to-action mappings; for example, 
does the word “access” indicate a collection, use or transfer? Furthermore, as 
discussed in Challenges Due to Formats and Writing Styles, we found that given 
purposes might be described using different grammatical styles. Lastly, we had to 
infer subsumption relationships between extracted terms to build our hierarchies for 
datum, purpose and action when they were not explicitly stated. To address this 
threat to validity, we aim to further study how an analyst identifies this context, what 
variability exists among analysts and what demographic factors of analyst expertise 
correlate with better performance for resolving ambiguities. 
Internal validity is the extent to which observed causal relationships exist 
within the data and, particularly, whether the investigator’s inferences about the data 
are valid [24]. A concern related to documenting analyst interpretations arises when 
we align the policy lexicons to compare formalized statements from two different 
policies and infer the presence of conflicts. This alignment requires us to assume 
answers to such questions as, “Is customer service equivalent to customer support?” 
or “Does ‘prevent crime’ include the concept of preventing fraud?” We documented 
these assumptions in separate files to allow us to revise our findings as new 
information became available. We plan to conduct human subject studies and expert 
surveys to understand the limitations of this lexical alignment. If disagreement exists, 
then our approach may be used to show analysts the consequences of two separate 
interpretations. Input from expert surveys and interviews, for example legal scholars 
and privacy officers, can help us understand the feasibility of resolving different 
interpretations. We plan to study the effect of user workload and human resource 
requirements on the usability of our mapping methodology. In addition to estimating 
the time required for mapping, these studies will also evaluate human effort required 
to deal with the challenges posed by our methodology, for example, resolve 
ambiguities, infer subsumption hierarchies, and so forth.  
External validity is the extent to which our approach generalizes [24]. We 
observed multiple styles of policy construction, as shown in Figure 7, wherein 
policies may describe their data practices at varying levels of detail. These styles 
and others we have yet to encounter may limit our analysis techniques. Furthermore, 
there are data practice descriptions in privacy policies that we are not presently 
accounting for, such as user consent, data retention and aggregation statements. 
Therefore, we plan to conduct additional studies of more policies to evaluate the 
generalizability of our language and to extend our language to account for these 
other practices. 
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Related Work 
We now discuss related work in requirements engineering (RE) and formal 
methods. In RE, Antón et al. analyzed over 40 privacy policies using goal mining, 
which is a method to extract goals from texts [1, 2]. Results include a clear need to 
standardize privacy policies and evidence to support a frame-based representation 
consisting of actors, actions, and constraints. Breaux et al. later extended this 
representation with notions of rights, obligations and permissions in a case study [6] 
and then formalized this extension in Description Logic [8]. Young introduced a 
method for mining commitments, privileges and rights from privacy policies to 
identify requirements [25]. Commitments describe pledges that one actor will 
perform an action and these commitments are frequently found throughout privacy 
policies. Wan and Singh formalized commitments in an agent-based system but had 
not applied this formalism to privacy policy [23]. In this paper, we describe a method 
to formalize specific data-related commitments, privileges and rights in privacy 
policies to logically reason about potential conflicts. 
Formal and semi-methods have long been applied to privacy policy and 
privacy law as an application area. Early work on semi-formal privacy policy 
languages includes the Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P), a website XML-
based policy language aimed to align web browser user privacy preferences with 
website practices [10]. While P3P has experienced wide spread adoption, the P3P is 
a declarative language, and website operators often make mistakes in how they 
configure these policies [15]. The EPAL is another declarative language that can be 
used to express data policies with constraints on purpose [19]. Unlike declarative 
languages, languages with a formal semantics can be used to reason about 
specification errors and inform website operators and other parties who depend on 
these policies about why a policy is erroneous (e.g., by presenting analysts with 
conflicting policies for resolution). 
Several researchers have since formalized privacy-relevant regulations, 
including the HIPAA Privacy Rule [5, 18] and the Privacy Act [12]. Barth et al. 
encoded regulations as messages passed between actors using norms (e.g., 
permitted and prohibited actions), which is similar to Aucher et al. [3]. May encoded 
privacy regulations in Promela and used the Spin model checker to identify potential 
conflicts [18]. These prior approaches are limited in that they cannot express the 
hierarchical nature of actor roles, data composition and purposes needed to 
describe privacy policies. Alternatively, others have used the Web Ontology 
Language (OWL) to formalize policies using permissions, obligations and 
prohibitions and to address this issue of concept hierarchies [14, 22]. The full OWL, 
which these prior approaches each use to express their formalization, is known to be 
undecidable. Work by Uszok et al., however, uses algorithms to identify conflicts as 
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opposed to theorem proving, an approach that may be decidable but which is 
difficult to reproduce and generalize as the algorithms are not explicitly published. In 
this paper, we extend this prior work by reducing conflict detection to DL 
satisfiability, which is known to be PSPACE-complete for the ALC family of DL, and 
we believe our conflict detection technique is generalizable to a larger class of 
requirements than those found in privacy policies. 
Discussion and Conclusions 
In this paper, we presented a formal language to encode data requirements 
from natural language privacy policies so that an analyst can reason about these 
policies by checking for conflicts and tracing permissible and prohibited data flows 
within the policies. We applied the language to real-world policies from Facebook, 
Zynga and AOL Advertising in a case study. The study demonstrates how to identify 
conflicts, which an analyst can then resolve by modifying their policy or their privacy 
practices as appropriate. We also discuss limitations of the data requirements 
specification language and opportunities for improving the language. Finally, we 
conducted a simulation to demonstrate the computational complexity of identifying 
conflicts in policies of similar size. As software increasingly leverages platforms and 
third-party services, we believe developers need lightweight formalisms and tools 
such as this to check their intentions against policies in the larger ecosystem. This is 
especially true as developers work with compositions of services in which they are 
not aware of all the third parties in their data flow. In future work, we plan to consider 
multi-stakeholder interactions across more complex service compositions.  
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